How does a person gain superconsciousness

About consciousness and our limits:

comes as expected, then we assume that random fluctuations for it

are responsible. The increasing refinement of neurobiological measurement methods

has now opened up the possibility of higher cognitive performance

complex brains as objectifiable behavioral performances from the third person

To represent perspective and analyze. They are already counting among these

Scientific methods investigable achievements such that we too

know from a first person perspective. This includes skills, for example

perceive and to remember to pay attention selectively to very specific stimuli

to steer and to deduct from others, to choose between reaction options

and to decide to suppress reflective actions - what with

increasing differentiation of organisms becomes more important to the value of

Assess rewards, bond with partners and this affective

to charge, and finally, the ability to have emotions, to be aggressive

or peaceful, content or frustrated. Let all of these behavioral manifestations

operationalize yourself, objectify yourself from the third person perspective and

can thus be traced back to neural processes. These are phenomena that appear in

be recorded in a coherent manner in scientific description systems

can; for if one process is an inevitable consequence of another, then must

both can be represented in a coherent description system. Corresponding

The neurosciences are increasingly succeeding in even highly complex ones

assign cognitive performance to specific neural processes. This one

observable cognitive performance with the to Grande lying neural

Processes are not identical, but result from, say, these

Behavioral performances are emergent properties of neural processes. In order to

should be expressed that the cognitive functions with the physico-chemical

Interactions in the nerve networks are not to be equated, but they are causal

explainable result from these.

This view is completely incompatible with it overprocreation against that

we participate in a spiritual dimension, that of the phenomena of the material

World is ontologically different. We get this overprocreation from ourr

Self-awareness and formulate only from the first person

Perspective out. Because we have this spiritual dimension of a different one

To associate the world of being, we assume that they come from the material world that is in the

third person perspetive is recorded, is not deducible. We learn our

thoughts andourn Will as free, as any neural processes

beforehand. But this is incompatible with the deterministic laws contained in the

in the material world. We feel our ego in the physical processes

opposite as free, in a sense opposed to them. We experience ourselves as

judgmental beings endowed with intentionality, who themselves and other

Ascribe responsibility for what they do and we feel able

With ourTo enter into dialogue with one's conscience ourn categorical

To argue imperatives our Mastering moods and us about

to override these determinants of action. Our appears to us

perceiving, judgmental and decisive I as a spiritual entity that

at best uses neural processes to provide information about the world

win and Turn resolutions into action. So that what is wanted becomes action

something must happen in the brain that does what it wants. There have to be effectors

to be activated and this requires neural signals. Accordingly, the

Sensory systems are used, so in turn neural structures to something

World about the existence of which our self-perception casts just as little doubt as our sensory perceptions cast doubt that the material world exists around us. These mental phenomena are obviously processes that we can precisely describe and perceive as relevant to action. It seems to us that our decisions precede our n actions and affect processes in the brain, the consequence of which is the action. We see ourselves as animated beings who participate in an immaterial, spiritual sphere whose appearances are only accessible to subjective experience. These are phenomena that can only be grasped from the first person perspective and which, as many of us believe, only came into the world because we were. On the other hand, however, and this is where the conflict arises, we know ourselves with the same over generation as belonging to the material world. We count ourselves among the organisms that owe their being-in-the-world and their being-as-is to a continuous evolutionary process that organizes itself from the inanimate world to increasingly complex organisms and finally to Homo sapiens sapiens has led. All components of this process appear to us as phenomena of the material world, as natural phenomena that can be objectified and described from the third person perspective, i.e. from the perspective of an observer: The initial conditions that prevailed before Life came into the world, the physico-chemical interactions that made reproductive structures possible, and the evolutionary laws that finally introduced the differentiation into plants and animals. We understand these processes as belonging to the material world, we can communicate about them and do not doubt that these are phenomena that we can and explain within the framework of scientific description systems . These evolutionary variables, which can be described from the position of an observer, naturally also include the behavior of organisms. This, too, can be objectified by the observer and , as can be determined, by the organization of the organism that produces the behavior, and in particular determined by its nervous system. The behavior of organisms is itself the subject of evolutionary selection processes, no less than the shape of a wing. Animals whose behavioral repertoire allows optimal adaptation to changing conditions have better chances in evolutionary competition. Behavior is thus a variable of the material world in which evolution took place and thus subject to the selection mechanisms as well as all other properties of organisms. Consequently, every component of the externally observable, measurable and objectifiable behavior must be represented as a sequence of processes that can be grasped within the framework of scientific description systems. Behavior is thus presented as a property that adheres to an organism and , like any other of its properties, is determined by genetic and epigenetic factors. This, I believe, compelling insight does not cause any difficulties as long as we only mean behavior of simply organized animals. We have no problem with the insight that animal behavior is completely determined by the interaction of stimulus constellations with brain states, which in turn depend on the genetically determined organization of the respective nervous system and its individual history. If it was then a little different

comes as expected, then we assume that random fluctuations are responsible. The increasing refinement of neurobiological measurement methods has now opened up the possibility of and analyzing the higher cognitive performance of complex brains as objectifiable behavioral performance from the third person perspective. Even now, these achievements that can be examined using scientific methods include those that we also know from a first-person perspective. This includes, for example, the ability to perceive and to remember, to selectively draw attention to very specific stimuli and to withdraw from others, to choose between and reaction options to suppress reflective actions - which becomes more and more important with increasing differentiation of the organisms, to judge the value of rewards, to establish bonds with partners and to charge them affectively, and finally the ability Having emotions, being aggressive or peaceful, satisfied or frustrated. All these behavioral manifestations can be operationalized, objectified from the third person perspective and thus traced back to neural processes. These are phenomena that can be captured in a coherent way in scientific description systems; because if one process is an inevitable consequence of another, then both must be representable in a coherent description system. Accordingly, the neurosciences are increasingly succeeding in assigning even highly complex cognitive performance to specific neuronal processes. Since these observable cognitive performances are not identical to the neural processes lying to large and e, but result from them, we say that these behavioral performances are emergent properties of neural processes. This is to express that the cognitive functions are not to be equated with the physico-chemical interactions in the nerve networks, but nevertheless arise from them in a causally explainable way. This view is opposed to the completely incompatible over generation that we participate in a spiritual dimension that is ontologically different from the phenomena of the material world. We draw this about generation from our r self-experience and formulate it exclusively from the first person perspective. Because we assign this spiritual dimension to a different world of being, we assume that it cannot be derived from the material world, which is grasped in the third person-perspetive. We experience our thoughts and our n will as free, as prior to any neural processes. But this is incompatible with the deterministic laws that prevail in the material world. We perceive our ego to be free in relation to the physical processes, as it were opposed to them. We experience ourselves as judgmental beings endowed with intentionality, who and ascribe responsibility to themselves for what they do, and we feel able to deal with to enter into dialogue with our conscience, to argue with our n categorical imperatives, to control our moods and us about these determinants of action disregard. Our perceiving, evaluating and decisive ego appear to us as a spiritual entity that uses neural processes at best to gain information about the world and to convert decisions into action. In order for what is wanted to become action, something must happen in the brain that does what is wanted. Effectors have to be activated and this requires neural signals. The sensory systems have to be used accordingly, i.e. neural structures in turn, to do something