How is social ethics ubiquitous and homocentric?

Journal of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig


1 Denk Heft 7 s t rö m e Journal of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig Published by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer Leipziger Universitätsverlag 2011 on behalf of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig

2 Printed with the support of the Saxon State Ministry for Science and Art Scientific Advisory Board: Ute Ecker, Dagmar Hülsenberg, Heiner Kaden, Hans-Joachim Knölker, Heiner Lück, Dieter Michel, Manfred Rudersdorf, Hartmut Worch Editor: Agnes Schaefer Editor of Denkströme: Saxon Academy of Sciences to Leipzig Karl-Tauchnitz-Str. 1, Leipzig, The online edition is available at <. All information on submitting manuscripts can also be found there. Bibliographic information from the German National Library The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographical data are available on the Internet at <. Any use of the work outside the limits of the copyright law is inadmissible and punishable. This applies in particular to translation, reprinting, microfilming or comparable processes as well as to storage in data processing systems. [The entry above only refers to the print edition published by Leipziger Universitätsverlag. The PDF files of the online edition are under the Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license . For further usage please contact the respective authors.] 2011 Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig Publisher: Leipziger Universitätsverlag Design and typesetting: Barbara Zwiener, Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig Printing: druckhaus köthen GmbH Printed in Germany ISSN:

3 Contents Editorial 5 Articles Ingolf U. Dalferth Religion-fixated modernity? The long way from the secular age to the post-secular world 9 Helmut Goerlich Secularity Religiousness Equality in a perspective that is not only fixed on the limits of constitutional rights 33 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt Diverse secularities. Proposal for a comparative analysis of religious-secular demarcation 53 Gert Melville In the field of tension between religious zeal and methodical operation. On the innovative strength of the medieval monasteries 72 Enno Bünz, Dirk Martin Mütze and Sabine Zinsmeyer Klösterreich a new look at Saxony before the Reformation. Why monastery books? Monasteries, monasteries and the coming of people in European, German and Saxon history 93 Christian Martin Schmidt Between eschatology and a closed work of art. Genre concept and biblical interpretation in Mendelssohn's oratorio Elias op. 70 MWV A Inge Bily Geographical names between Saale and Neisse in regional studies 151 streams of thought. Journal of the Saxon Academy of Sciences, Issue 7 (2011)

4 Table of contents Heidrun Wozel Current folk festivals and customary care in Saxony as regional identification and economic factors 176 Discussions Bülent Uçar On the home of Islam, Islamic theology and Islamic religious instruction in Germany 195 Anja Pistor-Hatam Reflecting on a statement: »Islam now also belongs to Germany «207 Richard Saage What is man? Comments on the Status of the Anthropology Discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany 213 Ortrun Riha and Thomas Schmuck “This Undignified and Suicidal Direction” A Voice from Russia in the Materialism Controversy 238 Johannes Bronisch What is Enlightenment? Reason and Religion in Christian Wolff 251 Detlef Döring "Sapere aude" or the necessity of autonomous reason. Reply to the contribution by Johannes Bronisch 257 Reports & Notes Encyclopedia of Jewish History and Culture, Volume 1 (A Cl) Contribution by Markus Kirchhoff 267 Aspects of Charity. Concern for one s neighbor in medieval vita religiosa Contribution by Mirko Breitenstein and Gert Melville 269 Johann Christoph Gottsched: Correspondence. Historical-critical edition. Volume 5: 1738 June 1739 Contribution by Detlef Döring 271 Leipzig edition of the works of Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy. New publications Contribution by Thomas Schmidt-Beste and Christian Martin Schmidt 274 Authors 277

5 Editorial Talk of the secular or post-secular age in which we currently live is omnipresent. The question of what exactly should be understood by the term secularization and how one can conceptually grasp the much-invoked "secular age" more clearly than just turning away from the religious remains open. The current issue of the streams of thought is dedicated to this main topic. In the modern self-image of (Western) European societies, the separation of church and state is a core element, even though it constitutionally only begins with the French Revolution and is quite varied in the further implementation, as the contributions by Helmut Goerlich as well as Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt make clear. However, the secular religious opposition is much older than the secularizations after the Enlightenment. The definition of the area of ​​a (politically, legally and economically constituted) world in contrast to a divine area of ​​the religious, including the distinctions between the profane and the sacred, is therefore in need of clarification. Ingolf Dalferth states that the word »secular« is currently used in the context of a movement away from the religious, which logically presupposes the religious traditions as earlier normal cases. Only in a post-secular society would therefore no legal regulation of religious tolerance be necessary, since toleration of religions becomes superfluous if recognition of the diversity of religious beliefs becomes a matter of course. In his interesting article, Gert Melville points out the difference between a spiritual and a homo religiosus, a monk or a nun, whereby the apparently remote life in the monastery, especially the orders of preachers, have the most important consequences for the development of occidental civilization . The cultural achievements of monasticism are not limited to the well-known areas of agricultural culture, from Walahfrid Strabos Hortulus to viticulture and the art of brewing beer, nor to the salvation of other remnants of Mediterranean civilization, upbringing, education and written culture already in the Benedictine order. The organization of cooperative self-determination of institutions through conventions and elections and the distinction between sin and a mere breach of a statute is also developed here 5

6 Editorial which in the end leads to the differentiation between general morality and positive law. The practice of researching conscience, the con-scientia or cordis scientia in the context of the sacrament of penance, is a kind of export from the life of religious people into secular society. It leads to an education of the human race under the ideal of honesty. The perfection of this self-control also results in a moral self-assurance, which can turn into self-righteousness, especially with religious reformers and revolutionaries, heresarchs or confessors. The chain extends to the zealots of the bourgeois and proletarian revolution such as Robespierre and Lenin and other self-appointed heirs of the so-called Enlightenment to which our volume contains a small discussion between Johannes Bronisch and Detlef Döring, while Ortrun Riha and Thomas Schmuck some of their sequelae in Russia Look at the 18th and 19th centuries. Enno Bünz's project, in which the Saxon monastery books are researched, is also dedicated to the memory of the great cultural achievements of monasticism in and for Central Germany. Inge Bily's essay on geographical names and Heidrun Wozel's study of customs and festivals then also negotiate regional studies. An oratorio like Mendelssohn's Elias cannot be understood without knowledge of religious cultural tradition. As Christian Martin Schmidt's contribution shows, the focus is on a transdenominational and thus thoroughly secular dramatization of the story of the Jewish Bible in contrast to the Christian Gospel and church songs of devotion. Not far is the way to Anja Pistor-Hatam's untruthfulness in the fashionable invention of a Judeo-Christian origin and Bülent Uçar's question how we deal with the neighboring or brother religion Islam in a world that is growing together. Richard Saages essay then offers a synopsis of the most diverse answers to the fundamental question "What is man?" From religious to scientifically shaped models, from highly general statements of a philosophical anthropology to concrete statements based on real historical developments. With regard to the ethical ideal of honesty, the modern age of moral reflection probably only begins with Hegel's criticism of Kant. Only subjective honesty or honesty as a mere correspondence between what we say aloud and what we do publicly is far from sufficient as Nietzsche later recognized and emphasized. True conscientiousness is much more than a good conscience or just goodwill. It is a critical and self-critical endeavor for what is right and true, recognizing given norms and free criticism, especially by others. Only with this insight into the dialogical-dialectical form of ethical reason is the image of what God may see in our heart completely secularized. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer 6

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9 Ingolf U. Dalferth Religion-fixated modernity? The long road from the secular age to the post-secular world We live, according to Charles Taylor, in a secular age in which belief in (one) God is no longer the "default option" but has become one of the options among others . 1 That hits a central feature of our time. But as long as we consider ourselves secular, we are not really secular. In the concept of the secular there is a reference to the religious that cannot be ignored without emptying the concept. This does not apply to the religious. One can live religiously without being related to the secular: the meaning of the expression religious is not always determined by the contrast to secular. 2 But one cannot live secularly without delimiting oneself from the religious: The meaning of the term secular always includes a negation reference to religious. This has not always noticed consequences. If what is meant by secular is negated, two options arise and not just one, as is often thought: One can understand post-secularity as regaining the religious (weak post-secularity) or as overcoming the difference between the religious and the secular (strong post -Secularity). Thus, post-secular is not alone or above all those who, in the face of secular modernity, see the opportunity again and take the courage to live religiously or to allow the religious to apply to themselves or to others. 3 Strictly speaking, this is only 1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Mass (German: Ein seculares Zeitalter, Frankfurt a. M. 2009). See the review by Jasmin Engelbrecht, “Ein seculares Zeitalter?”, In Denkströme 5 (2010), S. See also the conceptual studies by Ernst Feil, Religio, Volume I: The history of a modern concept from early Christianity to the Reformation , Göttingen 1986, Volume II: The history of a modern concept between Reformation and Rationalism (ca), Göttingen 1997, Volume III: The history of a modern concept in the 17th and early 18th centuries, Göttingen 2001, Volume IV: The history of one modern basic concept in the 18th and early 19th centuries, Göttingen Cf. Hans-Joachim Höhn, Postsäkular: Society in Transition Religion in Transition, Paderborn / Munich / Vienna / Zurich 2007; ders., The strange god. Believe in postsäku streams of thought. Journal of the Saxon Academy of Sciences, Issue 7 (2011), p

10 Ingolf U. Dalferth the one who lives as he lives, without even trying the contrast between religious and secular to characterize his life. Only those who do not live either religiously or secularly, but have to emphasize neither one nor the other in order to describe their life, have really left modernity behind. We only live truly secularly when we no longer have any reason to characterize ourselves in this way. 1. Disintegration of the theory of secularization The complexity and ambiguity of the term secular has been highlighted in a large number of sociological, political, philosophical and theological publications in recent years. 4 Taken together, they mark a significant change in the view of the development of the modern age that has been customary since the beginning of the 20th century. According to the common sociological view, the processes of change in religion "under conditions of modernity and accelerating change" exemplarily demonstrate that the path to modernity can be described as a scenario "in which mankind shifted from the religious mode to the secular". 5 This process is called secularization and the sociological explanation of this process is called secularization theory. 6 The view of modernism expressed in it was due to the European experience of the founding fathers of sociology Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. 7 But it was far too coarse to be specifically checked against the empirical data from various countries and cultures. The larer culture, Würzburg 2008; Friedrich Johannsen, post-secular? Religion in the context of social transformation processes, Stuttgart Cf. especially José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago / London 1994; David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory, Aldershot 2005; David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract. An Essay in Political Theology, Princeton 2005; Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton 2005; Taylor, Secular Age, supra note 1. A good overview of the English-language literature is provided by Kevin M. Schultz, "Secularization: A Bibliographic Essay," in Hedgehog Review (2006), S Martin, On Secularization (fn. 4), S cf. Hermann Lübbe, Säkularisierung. History of an ideological concept, Freiburg; Hartmut Lehmann, Secularization, The European special path in matters of religion, Göttingen Cf. Klaus Eder, »European secularization. A special path into post-secular society? A theoretical note «, in eurozine, p. 1 15; Manuel Borutta, »Genealogy of the Secularization Theory. On the historicization of a great narrative of modernity «, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 36 (2010), p

11 Religion-fixated modernity? The great so-called secularization theory was therefore divided into a series of sub-theories such as privatization (religion is a private matter, not a public matter), rationalization (religion must justify itself to the forum of reason in order to be legitimate) and social differentiation (religion is one social sub-system among others) broken down, each of which could be examined individually in different historical situations in different cultures. Today many sociologists are of the opinion that privatization and rationalization are not necessary features of a secular society under modern conditions. Others maintain that the theory of social differentiation is the still valid core of the secularization theory.Secularization as a history of loss Exactly this process of social differentiation is responsible for the change in the social role and significance of religious belief, religious practice and religious institutions in society between earlier times Times and blamed today. In 1966 Bryan Wilson defined "secularization" as "the process whereby religious thinking, practices and institutions lose social significance". 9 This definition assumes that there are societies in which there is or was religious thought, religious practices, and religious institutions that were once socially significant but are no longer, or are no longer as they once were . But it remains unclear whether to say that religious phenomena are disappearing from social life: religion has no future in modern society. Or that they are transformed into religious phenomena that no longer have any particular social relevance: religion will continue to exist, but it will no longer play an important role in society. Or that they are changing from religious phenomena to non-religious phenomena or are being replaced by such: Religions are created through non-religious functional equivalents in society. 8 Detlef Pollack, Secularization a Modern Myth? Studies on Religious Change in Germany, Tübingen 2003; ders., "Religious change in Europe: theoretical considerations and empirical findings", in Gabriel Motzkin and Yochi Fischer (eds.), Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe, London 2008, p; ders., return of the religious? Studies on Religious Change in Germany and Europe II, Tübingen 2009; Martin, On Secularization (fn. 4), S. Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society. A Sociological Committee, London 1966, p

12 Ingolf U. Dalferth sets. All or some of it can be more or less meant. Therefore, this definition is too vague and undifferentiated to be really helpful. 10 Despite these shortcomings, Wilson's definition reveals five important points: 1. Social relevance: Religious phenomena are examined from the point of view of their social relevance or social significance in a society. This is a sociological view, not the first or most important way that believers in a religion would describe what they believe and do. The definition addresses the problem from a sociological, not a philosophical or theological point of view. 2. Differentiation: A social difference between religious and non-religious spheres of life is assumed that does not apply to all societies, but is the result of social differentiation in Western (European) modernity. The existence of this differentiation is understood as a criterion of the modernity of a society. It is underestimated that even if it should apply to European cultural and social development, it does not automatically apply to other cultures or societies as well. "Instead of looking at European modernity as the only valid model," 11 one should It is better to speak of a multiple modernity or different ways into different modernities asymmetry: In addition, an asymmetry between religious and non-religious spheres is assumed insofar as people in modern societies can, but do not have to, live religiously while they have to live non-religiously and not only can. Nobody can be a member of a society without participating in the spheres of politics, economics, education, the media, etc. That doesn't seem to be the case with religion. This explains the widespread view that religion, unlike other social spheres, can not only change, but disappear from society entirely, while the non-religious spheres of society change, but cannot completely dissolve. People become 10 See David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, New York 1978; Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept, Beverly Hills, CA 1985; Casanova, Public Religions (fn. 4). 11 Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, “The Diversity of Modernity: A Look Back at the First Reflections on Multiple Modernities”, in the European History Topic Portal (2006), (). 12 Cf. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Die Vielfalt der Moderne, Weilerswist 2000; ders., Multiple Modernities, New Brunswick

13 Religion-fixated modernity? who always be political, economic, social beings, but they don't have to live religiously. However, the opposite is also argued, with anthropological or sociological arguments: people are no longer or less and less religious in the traditional ecclesiastical sense, but they nonetheless live religiously or spiritually outside the traditional ecclesiastical forms of organization in a variety of ways, regardless of whether they call it that would or not. 13 In addition, the problem of the difference between indeterminability and determinateness, which religions deal with on the basis of the key difference between immanence and transcendence, must also be dealt with in secular societies, so that religion can disappear in people's lives, but not at the social level or practicing individuals: the scope of the definition is unclear. She speaks of social practices and institutions, but implicitly makes assumptions about the attitudes, attitudes and activities of believers in a religion. It is assumed that people in differentiated societies either live religiously or non-religiously or both in different respects or on different occasions, instead of assuming (to name just a few possibilities) that they carry out different religious activities in different social spheres, or exercise different social roles in their religious life, or pursue their various functions and activities in society within an overall religious life horizon. And it is understood that non-believers engage in non-religious but not religious activities, while believers do and must do both. 5. Change: Finally, it is assumed that there has been a transfer (of meaning) of things, goods, practices, institutions, rules or ideas from the religious sphere into non-religious spheres of society. This transfer or change has changed the social relevance of these religious phenomena, but not necessarily their religious significance. They were religious and can still be in religious contexts, but they no longer have a function in the non-religious contexts of society, but are replaced and superseded by secularism. From a religious point of view, however, the loss of social relevance is only significant if social relevance for a religion or religious 13 Cf. Fritz Stolz (ed.), Homo naturaliter religiosus. Does religion necessarily belong to being human ?, Bern / Berlin and others. 1997; Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Grand Rapids, MI Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.

14 Ingolf U. Dalferth Tradition is important, which is by no means always the case (hermits, anchorites). Or when the religious does not determine the overall social context of life, but there is also a significant amount of non-religious practices, institutions or ideas, so that the change is not just a change from one strand or mode of religious life to another. Or if, from a religious point of view, this change is seen as a loss rather than a gain, i.e. H. unless it is understood as a goal of religious life to overcome the difference between religious and non-religious spheres of society by shaping the non-religious spheres on the basis of the moral ideals of the corresponding religion. From a religious point of view, too, the process of secularization need not necessarily be described as a loss story or "subtraction narrative", but could or should, as Charles Taylor suggests, be presented as a story of profit. The traditional view of secularization operates with three basic assumptions: the differentiation of social spheres of meaning and relevance, the difference between religious and non-religious practices, institutions and ideas and the change from something from the religious to a non-religious sphere. Where the difference between the religious and non-religious spheres of a society is disputed, there can only be changes in the religious or the non-religious sphere, but no changes from one to the other. And where it is assumed that social significance does not exist in different degrees, or that we should only concentrate on events and not on things (in the broadest sense), there is no change or change in one direction or the other but just a different distribution of social significance in a society at different points in time. Obviously, this traditional view is based on a complex understanding of secularization and secular. This requires a more detailed analysis in order to avoid theoretical misjudgments and argumentative short circuits. 3. Descriptive and normative uses of the term secular The term secular can be used in a descriptive and normative way. 15 The descriptive modes of use are based on the key distinction between secular and non-secular. Whenever the one page 15 The following sections take up considerations of my essay »Post-secular 14

15 Religion-fixated modernity? this opposition is evaluated positively and the other negatively, the term is used normatively. There are always ambiguities and ambiguities. It is often not clear what use is present and where the transition from a descriptive to a normative use of secular is made. But it is important to note this in order to understand what is meant when the history of modernity is described as the decline or decline of religion and the rise or increase of the secular, or the present as a time of the return of religion or the gods to one secular world. 16 But even the normative usage in itself is ambiguous, because the term secular can be used positively or negatively from different positions and thus has a different point in each case. Secularism can be used to denote the position that evaluates secularity or secularity positively and everything that opposes them negatively. But one can also mean the opposite, namely an anti-religious or anti-religious ideology, which is considered reprehensible. Obviously, the normative sense of these terms depends on whether they are used from a secular or non-secular point of view, whether those who use them place themselves on the side of the positively understood secular or the positively understood non-secular. The same phenomena, facts or developments that are described as secular, secularity or secularization are then assessed positively or negatively, depending on the situation. The transition from a descriptive to a normative use thus results in a view of the history of modernity as progress and gain (construction) or as regression and loss (dismantling) and accordingly in an optimistic or rather pessimistic view of the present, depending on whether one Is positive 17 or critical of religion. 18 Society: Christianity and the Dialectics of the Secular ", in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (2010), p. The terms opposition, contrast, difference and difference are used interchangeably to mark differences in meaning. 16 Friedrich W. Graf, The Return of the Gods. Religion in der Moderne Kultur, Munich Cf. Stout, Democracy and Tradition (fn. 4); Novak, Jewish Social Contract (fn. 4). 18 Sam Dobbelaere, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, New York 2004; ders., Letter to a Christian Nation, New York 2006; Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, New York

16 Ingolf U. Dalferth 4. Fundamental and derived opposites The term secular and its derivatives are in different contrasts or opposites, depending on how non-secular is understood. From a systematic point of view, the following binary contradictions have had a special meaning in European history: 4.1 Divine vs. worldly (vertical secularity or worldliness) The fundamental contradiction here is between God and the world. The world is created, not divine. Neither she nor anything in the world is to be confused with God the Creator. The disenchantment of the world (M. Weber) begins where two intellectual maneuvers are linked: the transition from polytheism to monotheism (God / gods) and the understanding of God's relationship to the world as creation and not as emanation or participation (creator / Creation). Monotheism in itself is insufficient to explain this development, as the Hellenistic cosmotheology (cosmotheology) shows in its various versions (Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic) (one cosmos, one god). Rather, what is decisive is the distinction between the one Creator and the one Creation (one God, one world). Only then was the world de-divinized or demystified, that is, consequently understood and experienced in a worldly way. The consequences of this development are a number of further binary distinctions in the description of the world. On the one hand, that between God and idol (idol, idol): God must in no way be equated or confused with a created reality. Wherever this happens, i.e. something created is deified, there is idolization, idolatry and superstition. On the other hand, the difference between belief and but belief: this distinction is not descriptive, but normative; it cannot be used in a descriptive way (in terms of religious studies) but only in an evaluative way (theological) from the point of view of those who really believe in God and not just one To believe idol. In the sense of this vertical secularity, (some) Muslims have rightly claimed that a secular life was always a matter of course for the Islamic world, because the decisive difference in shaping social life was that between God and the world and not that between religious and non-religious Spheres of Society 16

17 Religion-fixated modernity? shaft. 19 In a similar way, there are also important strands in Christianity that adopt a positive attitude towards the secular world, distinguish between secularization (positive) and secularism (negative) 20 and advocate "a legitimate place for autonomy of the secular" 21 because they understand the world as creation, which functions in its worldliness according to autonomous rules, which they owe to God their Creator. 4.2 Religious vs. secular (horizontal secularity or secular worldliness) But this vertical worldliness is not the only conception of secularity in the European tradition. In addition, there is a horizontal one, which can be linked to the first by setting a binary opposition between two (in the vertical sense) secular areas of human life within the created world: those executions that are intentionally directed towards God and God, and those who focus on created reality. This opposition can be understood and symbolized in different ways. In the local sense (and its metaphorical expansions) it is the binary opposition between sacred and profane, i. H. that which belongs to the realm of the divine (e.g. the temple) and that which lies outside this realm. It was precisely this opposition, common in polytheistic religions, that vertical secularity, based on the guideline of the cosmotheologically or creation-theologically conceived basic difference between God and the world, had rejected and rejected. To re-establish him under their conditions changes his punchline: only God is holy and that which is sanctified by God, 22 not that which people define or exclude as holy. 23 To perform a sacred act in the traditional sense or in a sacred 19 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Paolo Alto 2003, S cf. Friedrich Gogarten, Verfassnis und Hoffnung der Neuzeit. Secularization as a theological problem, Stuttgart, pp. 142 ff. 21 Robert Austin Markus, Christianity and the Secular, Notre Dame, IN 2006, S Martin Luther, "The Small Catechism" (1529), in The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church ( = BSLK), Göttingen, S, »3. Article of the Confession of Faith ”, in BSLK, pp. 511-23 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Secret of the World. On the justification of the theology of the crucified Christ in the dispute between theism and atheism, Tübingen, p. 283 f. 17

18 Ingolf U. Dalferth Be rich is no less secular (in the vertical sense) than any other worldly activity. Conversely, profane activities such as exercising one's profession responsibly or leading the life of a good citizen can acquire additional religious value 24 and ordinances (in the horizontal sense) such as making sacrifices to the emperor can become an inexcusable violation of the real one Believe in the one true God. 25 In this sense, Martin Luther insisted that the whole of human life should be lived before God as worship and service to one's neighbor, 26 not just in individual areas (celebrations of worship) or by some people (monks and nuns). True Christian life is not to be found in monastic withdrawal from the world, but in the ordinary professional, family and social life of Christians, if they live according to the will of God, and that means: according to the basic rule of Christian neighborly love.In the institutional sense, on the other hand, it is the binary opposition between ecclesiastical and political, d. H. what relates to the church and what, in contrast, is directed to the state or the political order. Insofar as both orders manifest themselves in certain institutions (Pope vs. Emperor; ecclesiastical orders vs. political administrations), the church or the ecclesiastical can be understood as one social institution alongside others. The contrast between ecclesiastical and political orders and activities thus becomes the starting point for a distinction or differentiation between different areas of order within society. Since society is the comprehensive social orientation horizon, this order difference cannot be set and described from a neutral point of view, but only from either a church or a non-church or, conversely, a political or non-political position. The non-ecclesiastical includes everything that is not ecclesiastical, whether it is political. 24 Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Mass.1989, S cf. Adolf von Harnack, "The charge of atheism in the first three centuries", in Oscar von Gebhardt and Adolf von Harnack (eds.), Texts and Studies on the History of Early Christian Literature (NS 13), Leipzig 1905, S Martin Luther, "Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum" (1517), prop. 1, in Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke (Weimar edition), Weimar 1883 ff., 1, p, 233; ders., "from the freedom of a Christian" (1520), in ibid., 7, p. Martin Luther, "De votis monasticis Martini Lutheri iudicium" (1521), in ibid., 8, p; ders., "Die Schmalkaldic Articles" (1537), art. XIV, in BSLK (fn. 22), p.

19 Religion-fixated modernity? is or not, and the non-political includes everything that is not political, religious or not. Therefore, there is a religious (or theological) and a secular (or sociological) tradition of using this distinction in the history of Europe, which are often mixed up, but have a different point and must therefore be distinguished. 4.3 Religious distinctions between religious and secular (horizontal secularity in a religious sense) From an ecclesiastical or non-political point of view, the opposition between religious and secular can be formulated as the binary opposition between ecclesiastical and secular, i. H. as a difference between church activities that focus on and belong to the life of the church and other activities of other institutions and actors in society. This is the same contrast as the one between ecclesiastical and political (cf.), but formulated from the standpoint of the church and not from the standpoint of politics or society in general. In a similar way, this distinction appears in a monastic sense as the binary opposition between clerical and secular. With regard to the role and function of clergy, this contrast differentiates between the monastic life of the religious clergy and the non-monastic life of the secular clergy. This distinction is made from the standpoint of a particular group within the Church (monks, religious clergy). It exemplifies that the external difference between the church and the rest of society is reproduced within the church in a series of similar distinctions with regard to the functions and activities of certain church institutions and actors. The same can be found in Protestant denominational churches, which differentiate between church-related and society-related activities, insofar as they know different ordinations for those who are called to serve the word (pastors) and those who are called to diaconal and social tasks ( Deacons, youth workers, social workers) In a functional sense, this difference can also be found as a contrast between church and secular social life. In this sense, works of art are characterized according to whether they are intended for religious or non-religious purposes. The so-called secular sonatas of the 17th century

20 Ingolf U. Dalferth derts, for example, were not composed for ecclesiastical use, but for private and social use and served not for religious edification but for musical entertainment. 4.4 Secular distinctions between religious and secular (horizontal secularity in a secular sense) In a political sense, the contrast can be formulated as the contrast between denominational and secular. This contrast was established in the course of the formation of the nation states in the wake of the wars of religion in Europe and served to relate or bundle a number of different developments, namely (a) the change from denominational strife to secular peace (political motive: century) , (b) the change from a monopoly state economy to a free market economy (economic motive: century) and (c) the change from an authoritarian religious past to a liberal modernity (cultural motive: century). In the light of each of these changes, the secular is emphasized differently and, accordingly, the religious is also understood differently. From the point of view of (a) it is said that secular political powers should not intervene in religious matters (religion is a private matter 28). From the point of view of (b) it is admitted and legally made possible that different denominations, denominations or religions can coexist within one and the same nation-state (religion is plural, religion only exists as contingent historical religions 29). From the point of view of (c), only that which can be defended according to public standards of a neutral and universal reason can be taken seriously (religious belief is prescientific and cannot be represented rationally or reasonably 30). Where these different judgments of religion as private, plural, and pre-academic- 28 See Thomas Jefferson, "The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom 16 January 1786," ​​Record of the General Assembly, Enrolled Bills, Record Group 78, Library of Virginia, in WW Hening (ed.), Statutes at Large of Virginia, vol. 12 (1823), S Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, »About religion. Speeches to the educated among their despisers ”(1799), in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit, ed. by Günter Meckenstock (Critical Complete Edition, First Department, Volume 2), Berlin / New York 1984, S Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, New York 2004; ders., Letter to a Christian Nation, New York 2006; Dawkins, The God Delusion (note 18). 20th

21 Religion-fixated modernity? Lich are linked, secular positions change to anti-religious secularism. 5. Levels of description of secularization In this sense, secularism is becoming a key concept of modernity, precisely in a normative, not in a descriptive sense. In order to be able to counteract this generalized view in a critical differentiating manner, CJ Sommerville has suggested distinguishing the following levels of description when using the term secularization: At the macro level of social structures, secularization refers to social differentiation, i.e. to the process in which The various spheres of society such as the economic, political, legal or moral are increasingly developing into independent operational areas with their own rules and procedures, which are mutually independent and relatively independent. 2. At the level of individual institutions, the term secularization refers to the transformation of religious institutions into secular ones. 3. At the level of action, the term secularization refers to the transfer of legitimate authority for certain activities from religious to secular institutions. In most western countries, governments, the non-profit sector and the private sector of society have taken on the task of ensuring the conditions of social welfare and social security. 4. As far as mentalities are concerned, secularization refers to the transition from ultimate goals (ultimate concerns) to goals that are closest or closer to us in the lives of individuals (proximate concerns). 5. Finally, at the level of the statistical description of the behavior of populations, secularization refers to the broad pattern of an increasing decline in the frequency and intensity of participation in religious life in contrast to the tendencies towards secularization at the individual level. These different levels of description are not necessarily related and do not imply each other. Without saying at what level the term secularization or secular is used, 31 C. John Sommerville, "Secular Society, Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization," in Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion 37 (1998 ), P

22 Ingolf U. Dalferth the use of these expressions only cause confusion. If these ways of using secularization are not or only insufficiently differentiated, the danger of using the term secular is no longer to be used in a descriptive and differentiated way of secularity, but rather in an evaluative and generalized manner of secularism. 6. Secularism in a positive and negative sense. It should be noted, however, that this term can also be used positively and negatively. Wherever it is used positively, the following aspects are usually emphasized: 1. In a political sense, it is emphasized that religions, religious activities and religious convictions have no place in the public space of a society. They shouldn't play a role in public society. 2. In an institutional sense, there is an insistence on a separation of state and church (political and religious institutions and organizations), whether in the sense of strict independence of both sides from one another, as in the USA, or in the sense of anti-clerical laicité in France. 3. In an ideological sense, religious belief is rejected as a key to understanding the world and an insurmountable gap between reason and religion is asserted. Religious beliefs belong to a pre-scientific past and have no place in a modern world and society guided by reason. Where these components are linked, secularism condenses into an ideological ideology. 32 Movements such as the Radical Orthodoxy, which oppose this ideological understanding with a Christian counter-ideology, have been directed against this in recent years. Secularism, secularity and talk of a secular world are being criticized across the board as modernist ideology. 33 Secularism, it is said, has dominated Western culture in Europe since the Enlightenment era, but its roots stretched back to the beginnings of Scotism and its far-reaching cultural effects. 32 Cf. Richard Schröder, Abolition of Religion? Scientific fanaticism and its consequences, Freiburg / Basel / Vienna John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, Oxford; Phillip Blond, Post-Secular Philosophy, London 1997; James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology, Grand Rapids

23 Religion-fixated modernity? back. 34 Scotism had seduced western thought in general and western theology in particular to turn away from the platonizing worldview of the church fathers and especially Augustine. He had promoted the tendency to replace a realistic worldview with a confused nominalism, advocated a misleading doctrine of a unified understanding of God and the world, defended the view that political authority was based on the will of the people and not on the will of God, and towards a questionable marginalization of theology in the academic institutions of the West. As can be easily seen, the radical orthodoxy criticizes the secularism of modernity by operating with the same broad and undifferentiated arguments as this one, only from a non-secular point of view and not from a secular one. 35 Charles Mathewes rightly emphasized that the representatives of the radical orthodoxy in their criticism of secular modernity start from exactly the same assumptions, accept the same problem, cultivate the same style of argument and think in the same categories as those who they consider as representatives of secularism and secular modernity criticize and attack. 7. The self-misunderstanding of fundamentalism This is the pattern of many religious responses to modernity and most of the fundamentalist rejections of modernism and secularism. They all position themselves on the anti-secular side of the contrast religious vs. secular, and they all blur the difference between vertical and horizontal secularity by identifying their own religious view with the view of God. In doing so, they overlook a number of important changes in perspective in the history of European culture and get confused in opposing perspectives: 1. It is one thing to determine from a religious point of view what is secular and traditional Christianity as what is not religious; to determine the religious from a secular standpoint as that which is not secular. The religious focus of the first determination (secular = non-religious) and the secular focus of the second determination (religious = 34 John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, London Cf. Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley (eds.), Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Post Modern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, Farnham

24 Ingolf U. Dalferth not secular) do not belong to the same perspective, but to different perspectives and can therefore neither easily be added nor opposed to one another on the same level. 2. Correspondingly, it is one thing to reject the non-religious (secular) view of religion as that which is not secular from a religious point of view (religious focus), but something else to reject it from a non-secular (i.e. secularly constructed) religious) point of view in the secular perspective (non-religious focus). In the last sense, the secularism of modernity is criticized from the very point of view that it created by normatively excluding religion and everything religious as premodern and non-secular from its worldview. 3. That is exactly what fundamentalism does: it reacts to the normative secularism of modernity in its own way, and in doing so it turns the religion it defends into an anti-ideology to the ideology of secularist modernity. Fundamentalism is not a return to religion as it was before it was marginalized by modern secularism, but a protest of the marginalized against modernity in the categories of modernity. What is happening here can be described from a theological point of view as a fundamental misunderstanding of one's own position. It is not seen that the vertical secularity of the Christian faith fundamentally questions the binary difference between divine and worldly as a difference within creation, insofar as all intra-worldly distinctions between secular and religious (in whatever sense) are on the side of the worldly and not be loziert of the divine. Instead, one tries to elevate the worldly contrast of secular and religious into a dominance of the religious over the secular by identifying the religious (in the sense of the horizontal opposition) with the divine (in the sense of the vertical opposition). Religious fundamentalism thus falls victim to precisely the religious criticism that it seeks to defend, because it has replaced the enchanted world with a view of the world as creation, which in no sense and in no way corresponds to the divine identify is. 36 What religious fundamentalism defends is nothing but a version of secular modernity that it attacks. 36 See Markus, Christianity and the Secular (fn. 21). 24

25 Religion-fixated modernity? 8. Post-secular? As has become clear, the meaning of the expression religious is not always determined by the contrast to secular, while in the sense of secular the negation of religious in some sense is always drawn. One cannot therefore speak of secular or secularity without bringing the reference to the religious into play. Even those who propagate a secular age remain fixated on religion. This seems to be seen where, under the heading of the post-secular, the overcoming of the religion-critical modernity by a more religion-friendly post-modernity is propagated. 37 But this only brings one possible reading of the post-secular figure of thought to the fore. The picture changes if you use the operator post not only to refer to secular, but to the entire contrast of meaning between secular vs. religious, i.e. not only referring to the overcoming of a secular modernity, but the overcoming of a modernity that is differentiated from a religious premodern determined as secular. Post-secular is then not an indicator for the regaining of the religious in the secular world of modernity, but for a farewell to both the secular and the religious that is associated with it. Only then do you not only live in a secular age, but in a truly post-secular world. In order to at least outline this in more concrete terms, the term post-secular is briefly explained in more detail in the sense indicated. A post-secular world only exists where there is a post-secular society, and it only exists where the state no longer sees itself or defines itself as secular. What does that mean? Basically, one can start from the distinction between the state (the political sphere) and society (the totality of all socially differentiated spheres), which has been firmly established since the 19th century. Since then, the relationship between state and church or between state and region can no longer serve as a paradigm for determining the relationship between religion and society as a whole.The former is a relationship between various subsystems of society (religion and state), while the latter is a relationship between society as a whole and one of its subsystems (religion and society). One must therefore think through the meaning of the secular in a differentiated way by specifying it in terms of society, the state and the lives of individuals. 37 Mike King, "Towards a Postsecular Society," in Network, the Science and Medic al Network Review (2003), pp. 7-11; ders., "Art and the Postsecular", in Journal of Visual Art Practice 4: 1 (2005), p

26 Ingolf U. Dalferth If one takes into account the difference between state and society, then in the development of European modernity one can distinguish between four typical constellations of state, society and individuals, which I, in obvious oversimplification, include religious, tolerant, secular and post - call a secular type of state. 1. Religious states prescribe the religion to be practiced by their citizens. 38 This can be done for religious reasons, because one is convinced that only this one religion is true and in accordance with the will of God, as was the case in medieval Europe. Or it can happen for political reasons, as in the European nation-states of the 16th and 17th centuries, where, in order to ensure the unity of the state and the uniformity of a culturally diverse population, insisted that one and only one religion be officially recognized and binding for everyone is: a state, a religion (or church). The state is religious because it prescribes a certain religion for its citizens, which is binding for them. Citizens of such a state in the full legal sense can only be someone who (as the case may be) is Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc. No distinction is made here between the state and society. The distinction between state and church is only a legal distinction between the political and the religious within a stratified society, which not only distinguishes fundamentally between God and the world (vertical secularity), but also within the world between religious (holy, clerical) , ecclesiastical) and non-religious (profane, secular, political) spheres and activities. For the citizens of such a state, both sides of the distinction are binding: Nobody can be a citizen of this state without also being a member of the corresponding church or religious community. The concrete form of such a state, on the other hand, can vary and either have the character of a theocracy (the coincidence of the church with the state) or a state church (the coincidence of the state with the church). 2. Tolerant states do not stipulate which religion is binding for their citizens. But they assume that all citizens practice a religion more or less intensively, as was usually the case in the European nation-states in the 19th century. 39 It may be a majority 38 This type also includes anti-religious states that prescribe atheism or exclude all or certain religions from their citizens. 39 Cf. Claus Dieter Classen, Religionsrecht, Tübingen 2006; Ingolf U. Dalferth and Cla Reto Famos (eds.), The right of the church. On the revision of the Zurich Church Ordinance, Zurich

27 Religiously fixated modernity? religion, to which certain privileges are granted (e.g. the Anglican Church in Great Britain, the Reformed Churches in Switzerland, the Lutheran Churches in the Scandinavian countries, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, Italy well beyond the 19th century or Spain). But other religions are tolerated, provided they adhere to certain rules, and they can be practiced by the citizens without endangering or forfeiting their civil rights. In such states, no specific religion is prescribed as binding for everyone, but different religions are tolerated: one state, different religions (or churches). Such a state is tolerant because, while it expects its citizens to practice a religion and may prefer them to practice a particular religion, it accepts that they choose freely which religion they profess and live want (religious freedom). In the horizon of the society of such a state, a distinction is made not only between state and religion, but also between different religions, churches, confessions or denominations. This promotes the distinction between society and the state (the political system) and paves the way for a socially differentiated social system and a secular state. Individuals in such a state can practice one religion or the other or none at all, and although this can be associated with disadvantages in social acceptance and reputation in one case or another, they do not need to fear that their religion will be religious or not -religious orientation could endanger your rights as citizens. In such states, religion is increasingly viewed as a private rather than a public (i.e., politically relevant) matter. And the better the implications of this principle for freedom of religion, the treatment of atheists and other non-believers, social stability and political acceptance of the state are understood and drawn, the more a tolerant state becomes a secular state. 3. Secular states (in contrast to anti-religious states) not only leave it to their citizens to choose between religious and non-religious ways of life. They forbid themselves by law to interfere in the religious or non-religious beliefs and practices of their citizens, and they expressly and in a legally binding form take a neutral stance on all questions of religion and religion. Secular states do not prescribe one religion, nor do they tolerate different religions, but rather they accept the fundamental right of every citizen to live the religious or non-religious life that they 27

28 Ingolf U. Dalferth want. 40 This applies regardless of whether they also insist on the duty of their citizens to justify their consent to compulsory laws not only religiously and thus for themselves, but publicly and with reasonably understandable reasons for everyone. 41 In other words, secular states are neutral not only with regard to which religion their citizens practice, but also with regard to whether they practice a religion at all or none, or whether they lead a non-religious or anti-religious life. In such a state no one is prescribed religious or non-religious views or ways of life, but everyone has the right to choose the kind of life he or she wants: one state, many religions and non-religions. Such a state is not only tolerant, but defines itself as neutral with regard to the option between religious and non-religious ways of life. He limits himself by law not to enact pro or anti-religious laws. And he systematically differentiates between the self-description of religious groups and traditions in their own language, terminology or symbolism (Christian faith, church, Christmas, Easter) and his own neutral legal language for these social realities (religions, religious communities, festivals, holidays, etc.) . Society is thus differentiated more and more clearly from the state and other social spheres (law, economy, science, religion, media, private life, etc.) and it is not only tolerated if individuals practice a religion of their choice or no religion, but they have one a documented right. 4. Post-secular states differ from secular states in that they no longer define themselves as neutral towards the religious or non-religious. They take no position with regard to the religious or non-religious way of life of their citizens, but they also abstain from emphasizing their neutrality or expressly stating that they do not take or take a position with regard to religious questions. To relate to the religious topic in any way has become irrelevant to them. This does not have to mean that it is assumed that religion and belief are unimportant, or that they are ignored, suppressed, attacked or viewed with more suspicion than other spheres, organizations. Michael Germann, "Church institutions in the modern constitutional state", in Andreas Arndt, Ulrich Barth and Wilhelm Gräb (eds.), Christianity, State, Culture: Files of the Congress of the International Schleiermacher Society in Berlin, March 2006, Berlin 2008, p See Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, Cambridge

29 Religion-fixated modernity? sations or activities in society. Rather, it means that the state no longer places the reference to the religious system in the foreground and expressly emphasizes it when it describes its relations to the other social spheres or subsystems by emphasizing that it is neutral or neutral with regard to religious questions secular. Such post-secular indifference is only possible under two conditions. On the one hand, the state, i.e. the political system, must have learned to clearly distinguish between its relations to society as a whole, to the other subsystems of society such as economy, law, science, religion, etc. and to the individual citizens and their practices, activities, To distinguish between outlooks and ways of life. On the other hand, he may no longer particularly emphasize the relationship to religion as opposed to the relationship to other subsystems of society, but only treat them as one relationship among others. This has nothing to do with the rationalization or privatization of religion, i.e. with the demand to rationally justify or morally legitimize religious or non-religious convictions, or to grant religions only a place in people's private lives, but not to grant them a public role. Whether or not religious or non-religious beliefs can be rationally or morally justified is a question for the people who represent them, not a task or a matter for the state. And whether a religion is assigned a private or public role is a question for society, not for the state. It is not a question of a political role for religion, but of recognizing that, in the wake of the differentiation of society, the differentiation of different publics must also be expected. 42 A post-secular state is accordingly indifferent and not only neutral with regard to religious or non-religious questions. There may be many religions and non-religions in a society, but the state sees no reason to define or emphasize its relations with them in any particular way. There is just as little need for a law that there may be no law for or against a religion, just as there is no need for a law that there may be no law for or against sport or gardening or making music. If it becomes necessary and problems arise, these can be dealt with pragmatically in the context of the 42 Cf. Ingolf U. Dalferth, »Public, University and Theology«, in Edmund Arens and Helmut Hoping (ed.), How much theology tolerates the public ?, Freiburg / Basel / Vienna 2000, S; ders., »religion as a private matter? On the Public of Faith and Theology ”, in Theologische-Praxis Viertelschrift 149 (2001), p

30 Ingolf U. Dalferth men of other laws can be processed. But the state no longer privileges its contrasting relationship with religion than that by which it defines and determines its function in society: it is no longer a secular state because it defines itself neither in a positive nor in a negative sense in relation to religion. In a post-secular society there may or may not be religion, but this contingent fact carries no greater weight for the political or any other sub-system of society than any other social issue. After all, individuals in post-secular societies may or may not live religiously or non-religiously; there may or may not be a religious subsystem of society with the corresponding religious public. But none of the non-religious subsystems defines its relationships with others in a religious way or by expressly renouncing a religious determination. If there is religion, that is a contingent fact. But it is nothing that would challenge or force society as a whole or any of the social subsystems to adopt a particularly positive or negative attitude towards it. Religion does or does not exist. Society is no differently affected by this than by the existence or non-existence of any other social fact. If one brings these very roughly drawn four types of state and society into a chronological sequence from the point of view of the key difference between religious and secular, then the following picture emerges: 1. At the level of the state or the political system there is a development from religious to tolerant and secular to the post-secular state, but the decisive change is that from the religious to the secular state, while the tolerant state is only a transitional factor and for the citizen between the secular and post-secular state in principle (although by no means necessarily factual) there is no significant difference. 2. At the level of the individual, however, the decisive step in change lies in the transition from a tolerant to a secular state, in which people with different religious or non-religious views are not only tolerated but have the legal right to change their religious or religious beliefs within legal limits profess and practice non-religious beliefs. The further change from a secular to a post-secular society, on the other hand, does not mark any significant change on the level of individual life, since nothing becomes possible now that would not have been possible before, at least not in principle: There is nothing that can be post - a secular individual could do and a secular one in principle could not have done, even if the concrete 30

31 Religion-fixated modernity? Living conditions may be very different in both cases. Everyone can live religiously or differently. 3. Finally, at the level of society, there is a development from a (relatively) undifferentiated society that does not (or does not consistently) differentiate between different subsystems, to a society that does this clearly and accordingly differs unequivocally from its subsystems and none privileged in a special way over others when it determines and characterizes itself. In a post-secular society, the political system (the state) has ceased to refer to itself not only as religious but also as secular and thus to define it neither explicitly nor implicitly by reference to religion. As long as a state describes itself as secular, on the other hand, it expressly rejects religious self-determination, but it defines itself negatively in such a way that the rejection of a religious determination becomes an essential element of its self-determination. It is one thing not to identify with a religion, another to refuse any such identification, and a third not to have any compulsion to refuse such an identification or to expressly be neutral towards religious, non-religious or anti-religious orientations or To confess life plans. Only in this third case is there not only a secular but a post-secular society. While it therefore makes little sense to speak of post-secular individuals, if one looks at the so-called "apatheists" from 43, one can speak meaningfully of a post-secular world and post-secular states and societies. But post-secular societies are not the ones where the tide of secularization has stopped so that people can again practice the religion and live the beliefs they want. Rather, they are those societies in which states no longer define themselves as secular. The real punch line when talking about the post-secular does not lie on the level of individual life, but rather on states and society: states can be secular or non-secular (pre- or post-secular). Societies are post-secular insofar as their political system has become indifferent to questions of the religious or non-religious. But on the level of individual life, 43 »An apatheist is a type of atheist who, rather than not believing in any gods because the arguments for them are weak, simply doesn t care about the existence of any gods and goes about life as if none existed «, bldef_apatheist.htm (); see.Dionysios Thriambos, "Apatheism, Allognosticism, and the American Religious Landscape", (). 31

32 Ingolf U. Dalferth the difference between secular and post-secular does not mark a relevant difference, because everything that is required for a freely determined religious or non-religious life can be found in both a secular and a post-secular society, provided that The distinction between religious and secular is understood in the sense of social differentiation and is not mixed up with the issues of privatization and rationalization. 32

33 Helmut Goerlich Secularity Religiousness Equality in a perspective that is not only fixed on the boundaries of the law Since the Romans eliminated their kings and their law, their law was that of the republic and, as such, its secular rationality. A secular republic emerged, which in the end only knew the citizen as a basis. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was completely different in its imperial tradition, a divinely determined order according to its understanding. It was not only since the Hohenstaufen dynasty that the emperor was in higher favor of God; the empire was not secular, 1 but it was exposed to several processes of secularization from within in terms of religious law since the Peace of Westphalia and increasingly from outside since the peace of Lunéville in 1801; Steps that led to its lackluster end. In the West, however, since the Enlightenment and the theory of the Republic 2, which it took up, but in England it is already older, revolutions have made not only new but also genuinely secular law possible. Secularization processes must therefore be distinguished from the constitutive status of secularity as the principle of a community and its law. This is what it is about, processes of secularization are no longer an issue here. 3 1 On immortality Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King s Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology, Princeton 1957, p. 291 ff .: the empire is now permanently transferred; on omniscience Marie Theres Fögen, The expropriation of fortune tellers. Studies on the imperial monopoly of knowledge in late antiquity, Frankfurt a. M. 1997; late antique processes of polytheistic resacralization are not the subject here; What remains is the separation of the secular from the sacred, see Wolfgang Waldstein and J. Michael Rainer, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 10th edition, Munich 2005, 5 Rn. 13, S Klassisch Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans. An Essay in the Rediscovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth Century England, Evanston On these secularization processes in Germany and the aftermath to this day, on the one hand after Lunéville Christoph Link, Kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte, 2nd edition, Munich 2010, 17, No. 2, Rn. 3, p. 121 ff., On the other hand for the inner preliminary stages of secularization Martin Heckel, "The Effects of Confessionalization on Law in the Old Reich", in the journal of the Savigny Foundation for Legal History. Canonical Department 96 (2010), p. 407 ff., Here p. 424 ff .; i. Ü. fundamentally different., From religious conflict to a settlement order. The special route of the German state church law from the Augsbur stream of thought. Journal of the Saxon Academy of Sciences, Issue 7 (2011), p

34 Helmut Goerlich For this reason, at least since the Enlightenment, secular constitutions have required religions and world views to comply legally with the secular orders they have created. Obviously, secularity requires the purely inner-worldly, so to speak rational justification of the constitution and law in contrast to any transcendent, fundamental or religious justification of the worldly order. The basis is a justification of law, as it has happened since rational natural law without regard to divine law, that is, law is constructed as if God did not exist, "etsi Deus non daretur". 4 This follows in the Western Christian tradition of the Euroger Religious Peace 1555 to the present day, Munich 2007; on both aspects with numerous evidence from a conservative Catholic point of view as well as the relativization of the characteristic of secularity, but not for those states that have followed the western model of the constitutional state for a long time, Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, "Secularity and Constitution", in Otto Depenheuer and Christoph Grabenwarter (ed.), Verfassungsstheorie, Tübingen 2010, 5, p. 153 ff., Esp. P. 159 f., Marginal 10. Eichendorff's dictum from the life of the state connected debate (ders., "Prussians and the Constitutions", in ders., Werke und Schriften, Vol. IV: Literaturhistorische Schriften, Historische Schriften, Politische Schriften, Stuttgart et al. J., S ff., 1320; the other, "about guarantees" 1833, in ibid., Pp., 1334, 1348 and passim) is not to be dealt with here, cf. lastly Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "The emergence of the state as a process of secularization" ( 1967), in another, The Secularized State. His character, his justification and his problems in the 21st century, Munich 2007, p. 43 ff., Esp. P. 71, still without evidence. However, Bernhard Schlink, "Between Secularization and Multiculturality", in Rolf Stober (ed.), Recht und Recht, Festschrift for Gerd Roellecke, Stuttgart 1997, p. 301 ff this post looks. On the "Desecularization" Astrid Reuter and Hans G. Kippenberg, "Introduction" in this. (Ed.), Religionskonfluchten im Verfassungsstaat, Göttingen 2010, p. 11 ff., With numerous references also in the articles of this volume. 4 Cf. Hugo Grotius, Vom Recht des Krieges und des Friedens (1625), Tübingen 1950, preface, p. 33. S. for the theological-philosophical debate about the Heimo Hofmeister formula, "Etsi Deus Non Daretur", in Neue Zeitschrift for systematic theology and philosophy 21 (1979), p. 272 ​​ff., also with reference to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Resistance und Ergebung, Munich 1970, p. 391 ff., esp. p. 393 letter to Eberhard Bethge from These sources indicate one older origins from Spanish scholasticism do not follow. Christian Thomasius, preface [scil .: to the above-mentioned writing by Grotius], names them all, see (footnote 3), p. 1 ff., Especially p. 3 and 19 ff .; for a classification of the famous quotation in Grotius also Link, Kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte (footnote 3), 16, marginal number 2, p. 102; the origin of the "etsi Deus" from the Spanish tradition (cf. Rodrigo de Arriaga; on him and the validity of natural law, even if God did not exist, a hint in Wilhelm Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte, 2nd edition, Baden- Baden 1988, p. 224) may be seen in connection with the tradition of secular-ancient Hellenistic-Greek science as the basis of the world interpretation in addition to religious interpretations, 34